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Abstract
This paper provides a labour supply explanation to the observation that
in Germany employment changes are asymmetric during the business cycle.
Employment increases are slower, because the reservation wage of workers
increases in times of job uncertainty. Workers are afraid in those periods of
losing their sunk and necessary human capital investments. They weigh the
risks and benets of investing in human capital with their certain outside
option when they decide about staying in the labour market. Human
capital investments are sunk and necessary, because rms need new skills
while older skills get obsolete at a constant rate. Skill obsolescence is
induced by innovations.
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Nontechnical Summary
Employment increases in Germany are slower than employment decreases. In
the literature several labour demand reasons for this asymmetry are presented
like the insider{outsider theory, shortage of physical capital and human capital
demand. This paper provides an additional labour supply explanation to the
employment asymmetry observation.
Employment increases are slower, because the wage that makes workers in-
dierent between working or not increases in times of job uncertainty. Workers
need a risk mark{up in order to stay in the labour market in these periods. They
have to be compensated for the risk to loose their sunk investment costs in hu-
man capital. Investments in human capital are necessary in this model in every
period, regardless of the situation in the business cycle, because we observe that
innovations are introduced regardless of the business cycle with a regular pace.
In addition, innovations usually require new skills from the workforce in order
to be implemented. These skills required by innovations frequently are rather
specic. The specicity may come from two sides. Either the required skills are
productive only in the few rms/sectors that introduce these innovations or the
new skills decay quickly and can be used only for a short time period. When
the employment prospects in an adequate job for the skills acquired in the near
future are weak, the expected pay{o of these human capital investments are
low. Here, the unemployment benet may be more attractive than the uncertain
earnings minus the sunk investment costs. Human capital investments are sunk,
because they do not generate any pay{o when no adequate job is found. The
wage in an inadequate job or the unemployment benet usually is not increased
by the human capital investment.
In a rst step, a standard micro{founded labour market model is developed
without taking into consideration human capital investment. Here, employment
uctuates symmetrical over the business cycle. If we introduce human capital
investments in this model, however, employment reacts asymmetric on aggregate
shocks, because the workers demand an uncertainty wage bonus.
In several extensions, it is shown that the results are robust with respect
to changes in the assumptions. In the rst extension, the Neo{Keynesian as-
sumption of xed real wages in the short run is introduced. A second extension
species the expectations function of the workers and a third extension argues
that also allowing for dierent regional or educational unemployment rates does
not change the results.
1 Introduction
Employment changes are asymmetric during the economic cycle in Germany.
We observe swifter declines than increases in employment. While employment
decreases with an average yearly rate of 0.053, employment recovery is inert
in a boom phase and increases signicantly slower with a rate of 0.039.
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This
pattern is well known (compare for example Caballero and Hammour 1994, Franz
1990 or Blanchard and Summers 1986) and several explanations can be found in
the literature. Blanchard and Summers (1986) mention three salient reasons
why shocks that cause unemployment might have long{term eects: shortage of
physical capital, insider{outsider eects and human capital.
Insider{Outsider theories predict that insiders use the increased economic ac-
tivity after a depression that reduced the number of insiders for wage increases
(see, for example, Lindbeck and Snower 1996). This leads to less additional
employment and in extreme cases to complete hysteresis during the following
up{swing. Direct evidence for insider{outsider forces on wage setting and em-
ployment is weak, however, confer Franz (1990) or Winter{Ebmer (1992). A
further reason for employment asymmetries may be scrapping of capital in slack
periods (see, for example, Winter{Ebmer 1992, or Caballero and Hammour 1994)
or an increase of capacity utilization after a depression at the same level of em-
ployment. These theories need a reference to wage bargaining behaviour and
capital adjustment costs, however, in order to be able to explain the observed
employment asymmetries, and therefore the pure eect of capital on the asym-
metries is unclear. This paper is concerned with the third argument|human
capital formation|and treats capital as exogeneous.
Human capital formation as a reason for hysteresis in unemployment has at-
tracted less interest than insider{outsider and capital shortage models. Most
models linking employment or unemployment changes with human capital the-
ory use the argument of deterioration of human capital during unemployment
spells. It is argued that individuals who have been unemployed for a long period
of time do not have the required productivity any more, because they did not
have the opportunity to update their skills by learning{by{doing or training on
the job. Updating of skills is necessary, however, because innovations require con-
tinuously new skills. In addition, the unemployed lost self{condence or are not
used to strict working morale any more (see, for example, Hargreaves Heap 1980,
Blanchard and Summers 1986, Moller 1990 or Goldsmith and Darity 1992). This
means that the unemployed lose their attractiveness for rms because technolog-
ical changes induce outdating of their skills or the experience of unemployment
undermines their working morale.
This paper introduces a new argument by focusing on incentives of workers
to invest in human capital. In this paper employment asymmetries are created
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See appendix for a description of the regression and its statistical properties.
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therefore by the labour supply decision instead of labour demand. The main
argument is that workers have a higher reservation wage in times of employment
uncertainty. The higher wage forms an incentive to sink costs in human capital
investments that are necessary for production, but have a positive eect on labour
productivity only during a limited time period. These necessary human capital
investments are caused for example by innovations. Innovations in products or
the organizational structure of a rm usually have the eect that certain skills are
not needed any more. In addition innovations require new skills of the workers
and continuous learning and training (see, for example, Acemoglu and Pischke
(1999). The literature usually assumes that innovations a rm has developped
or can readily buy on the market can be installed costlessly within the rm.
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If we take the eects of innovations on human capital (obsolence of older skills
and necessity to innovate in new skills) into account, however, we can derive
an additional argument for the observed employment asymmetries in a standard
labour market model.
Innovations occur on a macroeconomic level with a steady pace during the
business cycle (compare for example Caballero and Hammour 1994) and therefore
innovations demand continuous adaption eorts from the workers in order to ob-
tain the necessary skills to handle the innovations, compare e.g. Hargreaves Heap
(1980) p. 613. Those new skills required by the introduction of an innovation in
the rm are not necessarily specic in the sense of Becker (1975), but the fact
that they get obsolete after some time leads to the same characteristics from the
point of view of the employee: Either the employee nds or keeps an adequate
job for the skills acquired and earns the return associated with the investment
within a certain period or the sunk investment costs are lost. Investment costs
are sunk, because they do not increase the productivity in a job found at an-
other rm (this rm may have introduced a dierent innovation) or a job found
after a while such that the skilled required by the previous innovation are already
obsolete. When the worker gets unemployed, the investment does not increase
unemployment benets.
A second complication of human capital investments arises from the point of
view of the workers when rms innovate: human capital investments are made
under the uncertainty, if the current position can be held or an appropriate job
can be found quickly. As workers only invest in human capital if the expected
returns are higher than the associated costs, the willingness to invest decreases
in times of employment uncertainty because this reduces the expected returns to
human capital investments. This argument applies for workers and job applicants
alike, because human capital investments are required for employees and those
who would like to enter the labour market.
2
\The conventional industrial organization literature on R&D competition, (...), assumes
that the process of innovation is fricitonless and in particular that rms face no costs in acquiring
amy new skills they need once they have innovated." David Ulph (1996):85.
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Summing up, we need three basic assumptions in order to obtain employment
asymmetries:
1. Innovations force workers to invest continuously in new human capital,
while old human capital gets obsolete.
2. The acquisition of the necessary new skills is costly for the workers and
includes sunk costs: costs that can not be recovered when the employment
relation is terminated.
3. Workers form expectations about the probability that they loose their jobs
based on employment movement information from the previous period.
This paper demonstrates that innovations induce asymmetric employment
movements. First, a standard labour market model without human capital for-
mation is developed. Here, the employment changes are symmetric over the
business cycle. If innovations are introduced into the standard model, we nd
asymmetries in the reaction of employment on aggregate demand shocks.
2 A Simple Labour Market Model
In this chapter a simple labour market model with explicit micro{foundations
is developed without taking into account human capital formation. The prot
function of the rm is simplied to the following:
 = g(l)  wl; (1)
with g
0
() > 0; g
00
()  0; while l is the number of workers demanded by the rm,
w is nominal wage, and  the goods price indicating the state of the economy (e.g.
goods demand, government expenditures, exports etc.). is distributed uniformly
with upper and lower bounds  2 [; ] with ;  2 R
+
: There are no rigidities
like menu costs or hiring/ring costs. Labour demand of the rm is given by the
condition that the marginal revenue product of labour equals the nominal wage
g
0
= w. This results in a falling labour demand curve, D, which is depicted
linearly for convenience in Figure 1. In other words, it is assumed that g
0
= al
with a constant.
Every worker can decide to oer his or her labour power or not, therefore
there is no decision between consumption and leisure time. A worker supplies
labour if the wage is higher than her or his reservation wage. The reservation
wage depends on labour disutility that diers between individuals and the outside
option. When the wage is lower than the reservation wage, the worker voluntarily
stays out of the labour market. At the reservation wage the worker is indierent
between working or not, that is, the expected surplus when working has to be
equal to the certain unemployment benet s: The easiest formulation for workers'
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utility functions is to reduce the argument to monetary units and assume risk{
neutrality. When accepting a job, the worker has to take into account that
he or she might lose or quit the job during the period, because the state of the
economy  deteriorates and labour demand of the rm therefore is reduced. When
labour demand decreases, wages also decrease instantaneously in order to clear
the labour market. It is therefore in the logic of the model that the agent on
the shorter market side can renegotiate wages after a demand shock and dictate
the new market{clearing wage.
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When the wage decreases, workers with high
reservation wages decide to quit their jobs.
When labour demand l
t
is larger than labour supply n
t 1
, all employed work-
ers keep their jobs with certainty and their individual expected earnings are the
market wage w
t
. When l
t 1
< n
t 1
, workers lose their jobs randomly and their
expected earnings are the market wage w
t
with probability
l
t
n
t 1
, while they earn
the outside option s otherwise. The workers do not know the realization of  and
therefore
l
t
n
t 1
when signing the labour contract. As a consequence, they have to
form expectations E(:) about labour demanded in period l
t
after the shock has
occurred relative to labour supply n
t 1
at the beginning of the period. We assume
that expectations E(
l
t
n
t 1
) = f(
l
t 1
n
t 2
) 2 [0; 1]; with E(
l
t
n
t 1
) = 1 if l
t 1
 n
t 2
and
E(
l
t
n
t 1
) < 1 if l
t 1
< n
t 2
because the individual possibility to be employed may
not be higher than one for an individual. One motivation for this assumption is
that deviations of real economic aggregates from the trend are serially correlated
(compare e.g. Pissarides (1992) p. 1371) and therefore lay{os occur in waves.
Employment changes in Germany have the same direction for several quarters.
If in one quarter employment decreases, it is save to assume that employment
will decrease also in the following year or quarter. The average decrease in em-
ployment takes 12
1
4
quarters, while the average increase in employment takes 22
1
4
quarters in Germany.
The worker knows how many workers n
t 1
applied for a job in the previous
period t  1. As long as there is no shock, labour supply is not changed. Worker
i has the following individual expected utility s
i
t
in period t depending on his/her
disutility of work h
i
:
s
i
t
= E
 
l
t
n
t 1
!
w
t
+ E
 
n
t 1
  l
t
n
t 1
!
s  E
 
l
t
n
t 1
!
h
i
:
If we set the expected individual (monetary) utility of the worker equal to the
time{invariant outside option s
i
t
= s; we obtain the following expression for the
reservation wage
b
w
i
which is at least necessary to give a worker an incentive to
work:
b
w
i
= s+ h
i
(2)
3
The assumption of exible wages is relaxed below in a Neo{Keynesian setting where wages
are xed in the short run.
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That is, when w
t
>
b
w
i
; labour is supplied by individual i: Therefore it is clear
that the probability to be unemployed and the expectations of the workers about
this probability do not aect the reservation wage. The time{invariant aggregate
labour supply only depends on the distribution of the monetary disutilities to
work and the outside option. At the market wage, the marginal employed worker
with the highest work disutility is indierent between working and being un-
employed, while all infra{marginal workers enjoy a monetary utility above their
outside option. When the wage decreases, workers with high reservation wages
leave the rm. Therefore, we have an increasing supply function of labour S.
The function S is depicted linearly in Figure 1 for convenience (i.e. it is a linear
function of the number of workers while the number of workers is continuous in
order to avoid integer problems. In addition, h
0
is set to zero).
Let us look at a short{run equilibrium, where capital stock, price, state of
technology and wealth are treated as given. Neither the rm nor the workers
have market power and all agents are therefore incapable to push the other side
from their wage reaction function D or S. Market clearing establishes a common
wage paid to employed workers, and existing underemployment is considered to
be frictional and voluntary.
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The aggregate labour market equilibrium is in period 1 at point e
1
in Figure
1 with a market clearing wage w
1
. Labour demand shifts from D
1
to D
2
when
the economy experiences an exogeneous negative aggregate shock (
1
decreases
to 
2
): Assuming that the rm can instantaneously renegotiate the wage to w
2
,
workers voluntarily leave the labour market. The negative supply shock leads to
a lower employment level e
2
. In the simple labour market model, the reduction
in employment has no eect on the reservation wage of the workers. In addition,
it does not matter whether in period 0 the labour market equilibrium was at e
1
or for example e
0
.
If we assume that there is a positive aggregate shock, i.e. 
2
increases to

1
, we obtain a symmetric positive reaction in wages and employment. In this
case, wages are also renegotiated immediately and increase such that enough new
workers are attracted in order to satisfy the increased labour demand. Therefore
employment changes are symmetric over the business cycle.
4
Compare Goldsmith and Darity (1992), p. 450.
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Figure 1: The Aggregate Labour Market
3 Innovations Demand Human Capital Invest-
ments
Now human capital formation is introduced in the model. Innovations demand
costly human capital investments in every period. These new skills are acquired
by training. Innovations can therefore not costlessly be implemented and human
capital acquired in these training courses decays completely after one period.
Skills have to be up{dated in order to adapt to innovations that introduce new
and dierent products and production processes evolving with an exogeneously
given and constant rate. Innovations are introduced continuously during the
business cycle and therefore workers have to invest in every period independently
of . For simplicity it is assumed that this investment in topical or specic skills is
necessary at the beginning of every period and a xed amount c. In the tradition
of Ulph (1996) it is assumed that rms have to innovate in order to keep their
market share and that competition reduces all possibilities to earn a rent higher
than the investment costs from innovations. Therefore a worker who does not
have the new skills is not eligible to work in the rm while the production function
(1) is unchanged for simplicity.
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In the beginning of every period, all workers who want to join the work force
have to invest c in skills update. At that moment workers know the equilibrium
wage and labour supply. They do not know, however, the size and direction of
an aggregate demand shock on the economy that might occur during the period
when the skills are valid. Therefore expectations about labour demand have to
be formed like in the previous model.
Workers have to pay for their sunk investments in skills updates themselves.
5
The ex{post surplus of the workers who invest in human capital in order to have
the possibility to enter or stay in the labour market is:
s
i
t
= w
t
 
b
h
i
  c; if employed, and
s
i
t
= s  c; if unemployed.
The employed workers earn the market wage w
t
and have to deduct their disutility
of work and investment costs in human capital. In order to be able to compare
the model with human capital investments with the simple labour market model,
we assume a dierent scaling of the monetary disutility of work. The re{scaling
is performed such that with no change in employment both models are equal, i.e.
the disutility of work is now
b
h
i
= h
i
  c: Therefore labour supply is unchanged if
all workers expect to keep their jobs.
The expected utility of individual i in period t is now:
s
i
t
= E
 
l
t
n
t 1
!
w
t
+ E
 
1 
l
t
n
t 1
!
s  E
 
l
t
n
t 1
!
b
h
i
t
  c;
or:
s
i
t
= E
 
l
t
n
t 1
!
w
t
+ E
 
1 
l
t
n
t 1
!
s  E
 
l
t
n
t 1
!
h
i
  E
 
1 
l
t
n
t 1
!
c:
The utility s
i
t
of accepting a job depends on the expected chance to stay
employed in period t.
The reservation wage of individual i is:
b
w
i
t
= s+ h
i
+
1
E

l
t
n
t 1

c: (3)
The wage that is necessary to attract a certain number of workers is higher
in period t than in equation (2) if E

l
t
n
t 1

is smaller than one, i.e. if the worker
expects that labour demand in the topical period is smaller than labour supply
in the previous period, or if the worker expects that there occurs a negative
aggregate shock. When workers do not expect a reduction in labour demand, the
reservation wage is the same as in the reference model.
5
Even if the rm bears the actual costs of a trainee programme, workers have to invest their
time and eort. In addition it may be cumbersome for workers to adapt to changes.
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It is assumed that workers expect an employment decrease in this period again
if employment decreased in the previous period, i.e. E

l
t
n
t 1

< 1 if l
t 1
< n
t 2
:
The model with human capital up{date and training costs can be depicted
like in Figure 2:
-
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Figure 2: The Aggregate Labour Market with Human Capital Formation
Consider the situation that in period zero a negative aggregate demand shock
induced a reduction in employment from e
0
to e
1
: As a consequence, workers
expect a further decline in employment and E

l
1
n
0

< 1. Therefore the reservation
wage increases and labour supply decreases from S
1
to S
2
in Figure 2, because
workers charge a risk mark{up.
6
If we compare the results of the labour market
with and without innovations, we see that an identical negative aggregate shock
from 
1
to 
2
induces the lower market clearing employment level e
c
2
instead of
e
2
if we introduce innovations. A reduction in employment leads to a stronger
employment decline in the following period.
A positive shock on  in the wake of a negative shock also leads to a lower
employment increase than in the model without human capital formation. Con-
sider the case with a positive aggregate demand shock after a period with an
employment decline. The new employment equilibrium is at the labour supply
6
Blanchower also deducts this result in his perfect competition model without referring
to the problems of sunk costs: \Fear of unemployment has to be compensated, like any other
disutility, by greater remuneration." (Blanchower 1991 p. 484).
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curve S
2
instead of S
1
and therefore at a lower employment level for all levels of
labour supply. This establishes our result that employment declines are stronger
and employment increases weaker after a period of employment decline. The
employment movements are the same as in the reference labour market when
employment was unchanged or increased in the previous period. Therefore the
introduction of human capital investments caused by innovations leads to asym-
metric employment reactions during the business cycle.
If the output price is unchanged in period 2, the employment increases to
e
2
at the beginning of period 3, because the perceived risk is reduced. Then
the reservation wage equals s + h
i
again in period 3. Therefore the asymmetric
employment eect of human capital investment is only of a temporary nature and
labour supply shifts back to S
1
after one period if no new adverse employment
shocks occur.
3.1 Extensions
The argument given in this paper is general and may be applied to several sit-
uations. In order to validate the hypothesis that workers ask for a risk wage
mark{up in times of employment uncertainty when they have to sink costs in
order to invest in specic human capital, several assumptions may be further
specied. In order to show that the basic and general model easily may be mod-
ied in order to introduce facts encountered empirically, several extensions are
presented here.
 Neo{Keynesian Labour Market
The assumption of immediately clearing labour markets and free oating
wages is certainly not always realistic. We demonstrate now that the results
are virtually unchanged if we assume instead that the wage is xed during one
period. According to standard Neo{Keynesian labour market models, it is there-
fore assumed that the wages are set market{clearing at the beginning of the
period and may be changed only at the beginning of the next period.
The sequence of events in the model with human capital formation can be
illustrated in the following diagram:
-
1st period
2nd period
t
w

c w

D
S
Diagram 1: Sequence of Events when Wages are xed
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Before the wage adapts and workers can apply for a job or extend their employ-
ment contract, all workers who want to join the work force have to invest c in
skills update. At that moment workers know the market clearing wage. They do
not know, however, if there is a shock on the economy during this period that in-
duces a reaction of labour demand D: The rigidity of wages leads to involuntary
unemployment in the wake of an adverse shock. Labour demand shifts to the
left, while labour supply is unchanged at a given wage. Therefore, the number
of unemployed after an adverse shock is, other things equal, higher than in the
model with instantaneous wage changes. The workers form expectations about
the size of the employment reductions again and their reservation wage is equal to
equation (3). The wage w
t
does not adapt during the period and therefore labour
demand shifts horizontally from labour demand curve D
t 1
to D
t 1
. Workers as-
sume that the reduction in employment in this period is related to that in the
last period, because employment reductions occur in waves. Therefore workers
ask for a higher risk mark{up than in the case with exible wages, because the
employment uctuations are higher at given adverse shocks. In addition, it is
clear that the reservation wage equals (2) in the model without human capital
investments and therefore the model without human capital investments is still
symmetric when wages are rigid.
-
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Figure 3: Labour Market with Fixed Wages and Human Capital Formation
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Consider the situation that in period zero a negative aggregate demand shock
induced involuntary unemployment e
0
  e
Y
: As a consequence, labour supply
decreases to S
2
and workers charge a risk mark{up. A negative aggregate shock
from 
1
to 
2
incurs involuntary unemployment e
1
  e
Z
: The market clearing
employment level will be e
c
2
instead e
2
in the beginning of the next period. Labour
supply is shifted from S
1
to S
2
because workers expect the further decline in
employment after the experience of involuntary unemployment in period 0. The
asymmetry is therefore also obtained if wages are rigid in the short run.
 Expectations
Until now, we did not specify the expectation formation of the workers about
labour demand. We only assumed that the workers expect a reduction in employ-
ment in the next period when in this period there was a reduction in employment,
because employment reductions come in waves. Frequently, adaptive expectations
are assumed, for example E

l
t
n
t 1

= 
l
t 1
n
t 2
: A high  implies that workers think
that the decrease in employment is strongly related between both periods and
that the relative number of workers red is comparable to that in the previous
period.  of zero implies that workers do not expect  to decrease further.
 Regional or Skill{Specic Unemployment Rate
The incidence of unemployment is diverse with respect to regions, tenure and
educational levels. As workers are not perfectly mobile and cannot replace their
educational level, tenure or qualications at will, they frequently will not consider
the aggregate changes in employment as an indicator for their personal risk to
get unemployed. Instead, workers base their expectations on the regional rate or
the rate for workers with a comparable tenure or educational level. Nevertheless
the asymmetry results are also obtained on the macroeconomic level if only some
educational groups or workers in certain regions were exposed to employment risk
in the period and innovations require that all workers invest regularly in human
capital.
4 Limitations
This paper shows that innovations that cause a necessity to invest in human
capital and obsolescence of previous skills lead to an asymmetry in the cyclical
movements of employment. Workers ask for a risk{mark up when they perceive
a risk to lose their jobs. This may partly explain the asymmetries in the de-
velopment of employment observed in Germany where the employment growth
rates are signicantly lower than employment decline rates. The paper does not
take into account several factors that may be relevant empirically, however. For
11
example we do not account for dierent forms of wage bargaining, but it is as-
sumed that the rm is the residual claimant by setting the utility of the marginal
worker equal to his or her outside option. It is frequently observed that rms
grant part of the rent created by workers to workers in \good times" according
to fairness or gift{exchange considerations. In \bad times" these bonuses may be
reduced however according to the reduced prots or a weaker bargaining position
of the workers. In addition, unemployment has no emotional or social value in
this model. In reality, people tend to regard unemployment as a bad in addi-
tion to the decline of income associated with it. When happiness is negatively
aected by unemployment spells (compare for example Clark and Oswald 1994),
workers are more willing to comply to company needs especially in times of em-
ployment uncertainty. Both factors may conceal the risk mark{up eect derived
in this paper in an empirical investigation. Therefore these factors have to be
taken into account by analyzing the investment behaviour of workers in specic
or time{dependent skills.
5 Appendix: Empirical Evidence
In order to test, whether employment growth is symmetric during the business
cycle in (West-)Germany, the employment growth rate is separately calculated
for periods of employment growth and for periods of decreases in employment.
First, the logarithm of quarterly employment data are seasonally adjusted by
the Census X-11 method, then the entire sample is split into two sub{samples
with positive and with negative employment changes. Finally, the growth rate
of employment GROWTH is regressed by ordinary least squares on two dummy
variables UP (for positive employment growth) and DOWN (for negative em-
ployment growth) in order to demonstrate that the employment growth rate in
periods with employment increases is larger than in periods with employment
reductions.
GROWTH = 
1
UP + 
2
DOWN + "
The coeÆcients are presented in the Table 1 below .
Data Source: DIW Vierteljahrliche Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnung.
We chose the West{German data series in order to avoid biased eects result-
ing from the structural decline in East{Germany after the re{unication. If we
include the employment movements in East{Germany, however, the results are
roughly the same.
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DependentVariable: GROWTH
Method: Least Squares
Sample(adjusted): 1961:1 1998:1
Included observations: 149 after adjusting endpoints
Variable CoeÆcient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
UP 0.009835 0.000828 11.87650 0.0000
DOWN -0.013198 0.001131 -11.66891 0.0000
R-squared 0.647468 Mean dependent var 0.001797
Adjusted R-squared 0.645070 S.D. dependent var 0.013690
S.E. of regression 0.008156 Akaike info criterion -6.766748
Sum squared resid 0.009779 Schwarz criterion -6.726427
Log likelihood 506.1227 F-statistic 269.9835
Durbin-Watson stat 0.479834 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Table 1: Employment Development is Asymmetric
The Wald{Test shows at a signicance level of less than 2 % that j
1
j 6= j
2
j.
Therefore we nd an asymmetry between periods of positive and negative em-
ployment growth in Germany.
The same regression is also performed with employment data smoothed and
de{trended by Hodrick{Prescott ltering (with a smoothing factor of 1.600 which
is the default for quarterly data). The results are virtually the same:
Dependent Variable: GROWTH
Method: Least Squares
Sample(adjusted): 1961:1 1998:1
Included observations: 149 after adjusting endpoints
Variable CoeÆcient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
UP 0.006099 0.000459 13.28243 0.0000
DOWN -0.004386 0.000536 -8.176467 0.0000
R-squared 0.599982 Mean dependent var 0.001665
Adjusted R-squared 0.597261 S.D.dependent var 0.006710
S.E. of regression 0.004258 Akaike info criterion -8.066706
Sum squared resid 0.002665 Schwarz criterion -8.026384
Log likelihood 602.9696 F-statistic 220.4839
Durbin-Watson stat 0.268264 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Table 2: Employment Development Asymmetries with Filtered Data
The Wald-Test shows at a signicance level of less than 2 % that j
1
j 6= j
2
j.
Therefore we nd also for the ltered data an asymmetry between periods of
positive and negative employment growth in Germany.
From 1960 to 1998, we observe 4 periods with continuous employment in-
creases and 4 periods with continuous employment decreases. If we calculate the
13
average length of each period, we nd 22
1
4
quarters for upswings and 12
1
4
quarters
for downswings.
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